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Abstract
Economic inequality and climate change are pressing issues that have climbed high up the political
agenda, yet action to mitigate both remains slow. As income is a key determinant of ecological
impacts, the Global North—and wealthier classes elsewhere—are the primary drivers of global
carbon emissions, while the least well off have contributed the least yet are set to be hit hardest by
climate impacts. These inequalities are clearly unjust, but the interrelations between economic
inequality and ecological impacts are complex, leaving open the question of whether reducing the
former would mitigate the latter, in the absence of reductions in total economic output. Here, we
contribute to these debates by estimating the carbon-footprint implications of reducing income
(and hence expenditure) inequalities within 32 countries of the Global North to the levels people
consider to be fair; levels that are substantially smaller than currently exist. We find that realising
these levels of economic inequality brings comparable reductions in carbon-footprint inequalities.
However, in isolation, implementing fair inequalities has a negligible impact upon total emissions.
In contrast, recomposing consumption—by reducing inequalities in household expenditure and
the overall levels, then reallocating the reductions to public services—reduces carbon footprint by
up to 30% in individual countries and 16% overall and, crucially, still allows the consumption of
those at the bottom to rise. Such reductions could be significant on a global level, and they would
be additional to the full range of conventional technological and demand-side measures to reduce
carbon emissions.
1. Introduction
Economic inequality and climate change are press-
ing issues that have climbed high up the political
agenda in recent decades, each featuring in multiple
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). How-
ever, action to mitigate both remains slow. Multiple
planetary boundaries are being breached in amajority
of countries [1] and—pandemics aside [2]—global
carbon emissions are yet to show signs of peaking
[3]. Currently, even if Nationally Determined Con-
tributions are fulfilled, emissions in 2030 are expec-
ted to exceed the least-cost pathway for staying within
2◦ by ∼30% [4]; this, while recent research traces all
five mass-extinction events in Planet Earth’s history
to global heating processes [5].
Alongside these increasing ecological impacts,
there has been a rise in economic inequalities. By
some measures, inequalities have been rising since
∼1980 and are returning to pre-World War II levels,
with the top 1% now taking ∼10%–20% of income
in countries across the Global North and South [6].
Such inequalities are forecast to increase further if
rates of return on capital remain larger than eco-
nomic growth (ibid). Even self-identifying plutocrats
are openly fearful of the outrage and social instability
this is bringing [7].
As income is a key determinant of ecological
impacts, the Global North—and, increasingly,
wealthier classes elsewhere—are primary drivers of
global carbon emissions and the wider ecological
damages of which we are only seeing the beginning
[8]. Globally, the top 10% of emitters account for
∼35%–50% of all emissions, while the bottom 50%
account for less than 15% [8, 9]. Similar trends are
found nationally—energy- and carbon-footprint
inequalities across income groups are substantial
in countries around the globe [10–12], and income
inequalities within countries are becoming the dom-
inant force shaping global inequality [8, 13]. Such
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injustices will be exacerbated by the fact that the least
well off will generally be the most negatively affected
by issues they have contributed to the least—while
food shortages and droughts devastate sub-Saharan
Africa and beyond, the super-rich and better prepared
of themiddle-classes of theGlobalNorthmaymigrate
to secret bunkers purchased on the now flourishing
‘apocalypse real estate’ market [14].
Existing economic and ecological inequalities are
clearly unjust. However, the interrelations between
economic inequality and ecological impacts are com-
plex [15, 16] and the degree to which the former are
a driver of the latter is unclear. There are, of course,
a multiplicity of ways that income could be redistrib-
uted [17]. But whether reducing economic inequalit-
ies could mitigate global ecological issues remains an
open (and contentious) question.
Herein, we contribute to the debate in a specific
and novel way, by exploring the implications ‘fair’
economic inequalities could have for carbon foot-
prints. By combining energy- and carbon-footprint
models disaggregated across income groups for 32
countries of the Global North, with social survey data
reporting the fair (or ideal) levels of income inequal-
ity people in these countries believe should exist [18],
we estimate the changes in footprints that would fol-
low if such public preferences were realised. The fair
economic inequalities people express are far smaller
than those currently existing, but in many countries
the former remain substantial nonetheless [19]. This
synthesis of surveys on public values and environ-
mental footprint modelling represents a major part
of the novelty of our work.
As expected, our results show that if these fair
levels of income inequality were realised, energy- and
carbon-footprint inequalities would also be signific-
antly reduced.However, with all else being equal, total
footprints would be unaffected. We thus explore both
reductions in and recompositions of consumption
[20], which may substantially lower total footprints,
and which lower inequality may itself permit.
2. Background
2.1. Ecological inequalities
Large inequalities in nations’ carbon emissions go
back to the beginnings of the industrial revolution;
before 1930 over 80% of global emissions occurred
within European and North American countries [8].
With the rapid economic growth of regions like China
and Brazil, disparities between the Global North and
Global South have reduced [13]. But large inequalit-
ies remain—territorial emissions and energy use are
an order of magnitude larger in countries like the
USA and Australia (∼20 t CO2e cap−1) than in low-
income countries within sub-SaharanAfrica and else-
where (∼1–3 t CO2e cap−1) [21].
However, to fully understand inequalities it is
necessary to consider consumption-based measures.
Referred to as ‘footprints’, these allocate supply-
chain carbon or energy use to the point of final
consumption—a task normally achieved using envir-
onmentally extended input–output models (EEIO)
[22, 23]. When footprints are considered, interna-
tional inequalities appear larger still. The USA, EU
and Japan are net emissions importers, with car-
bon footprints ∼12%–23% higher than their territ-
orial emissions, while countries in the Global South
are often net emissions exporters [24]. Sub-national
inequalities are also substantial: in low- or lower-
income countries, per-capita carbon footprints of
those in severe poverty can be two orders of mag-
nitude less than those of the upper-classes, now that
footprints of the latter frequently match those of
wealthier classes in the Global North [9, 13].
The difficult questions involve exploring what
reducing these inequalities could mean for ecolo-
gical impacts. Many studies suggest there exist trade-
offs between inequality [25] (or poverty [26]) and
carbon emissions, such that mitigating the former
increases emissions [13, 27, 28]. This finding is com-
mon for wealthier countries [29]. But beyond the
Global North, any such trade-offs may be minor.
Eliminating extreme poverty—bringing everyone up
to $1.90 d−1—may increase global emissions by only
a few per cent, while capping all national income Gini
coefficients to 0.3 would increase global emissions
by <1% [27]. Even these minor trade-offs may be
exaggerated, as researchers often equate poverty alle-
viation and development with increasing affluence,
despite the assumption’s crudeness [26]. Decent liv-
ing standards like adequate nutrition, access to clean
water, and sanitation services are not tightly coupled
to overall carbon emissions; rather, widespread pro-
vision is normally achieved at low per-capita carbon
footprints and relationships saturate thereafter (ibid).
And in some contexts, increasing the incomes of the
poorest can reduce their emissions due, for example,
to their ability to then purchase cleaner and healthier
fuels [30]. Interactions between inequality and car-
bon emissions thus remain unclear.
2.2. The notion of fair inequalities
We focus upon income inequalities within countries
of the Global North, reducing them to the fair levels
emerging from survey data. But what is meant by
fair inequality? The important distinction to draw
is between fairness and equality [31]. Starmans et al
argue the tendency often found in public discourse to
assert that humans have an aversion to inequality is
unsubstantiated, and that ‘people prefer fair inequal-
ity over unfair equality’ [18, p 1].
But how to define fair? In economic contexts, fair-
ness is widely thought to be achieved when a condi-
tion of equality of opportunity exists, which elimin-
ates all privilege so inequalities in outcome perfectly
reflect people’s merit—their aptitude, hard work,
dedication and willingness to take risks. In a word,
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meritocracy [32]. There are no countries in which a
genuine meritocracy exists, but the degree to which
people believe their society represents a one varies
substantially. The USA, while not unique [33, 34], is
one example of a society where a widespread belief
in the existence of meritocracy is found alongside
an entrenched class system [35] (hence the popular
joke—Person 1: Do you know how the USA’s class sys-
tem works? Person 2: I didn’t think the USA had a
class system? Person 1: Yes, that’s how it works).Within
countries, belief in the existence of meritocracy var-
ies in predictable ways—upper-income groups are
more likely than lower-income groups to see eco-
nomic inequalities as resulting from merit [36]. Fur-
ther, the ideals of meritocracy are deeply question-
able in themselves, as John Rawls argued decades ago
[37] and as many egalitarian hunter-gatherers have
figured out themselves [38, 39]. The argument, in
short, is that one’s aptitude, capacity for hard work,
and numerous other physical and psychological traits
emerge from a complexity of social, developmental
and genetic factors which one can hardly claim to
have controlled [40].
With this in mind, how do researchers determ-
ine people’s fair levels of economic inequality? Typ-
ically, this is via national surveys asking how large
people think current inequalities are, and how large
they think they should be. The latter question is some-
times approached semi-quantitatively—by, say, ask-
ing howmuch people agreewith the statement income
differences in your country are too high [41]. Altern-
atively, people are asked to specify their ideal income
ratio between the highest earners and unskilled work-
ers [19]. One detailed study asked people to describe
their preferences for fair wealth distribution across
quintiles [42], but the data is only available for
the USA.
A key finding of this research is that most people
drastically underestimate existing economic inequal-
ities in their country [43], while also asserting that
even their perceived inequalities are unfairly large
[19]; a result surprisingly consistent across income
groups and political identities (ibid). Yet, the inequal-
ities people believe are fair remain considerable in
many countries. Nationally averaged fair income
ratios of the highest to lowest earners frequently
exceed 10:1 [19, 34] and one study reports fair wealth
ratios in the USA to be 50:1 [44]. Further, people
fully embracing meritocratic values do not seem con-
cerned with whatever inequalities prevail, provided
meritocratic procedures are in place [45]. Despite
these variations, however, even within the USA—
where political polarisation is severe—the ‘ideal’
levels of wealth and income inequality expressed by
people of different political leanings, socioeconomic
status and genders are remarkably similar [42].
The challenge for our work is to take these data
describing public notions of fair inequality, most
widely available for income inequality, and translate
them into household expenditure distributions, which
our footprintmodels require.We nowbriefly describe
these models.
3. Methodology
3.1. Modelling environmental footprints
Footprints—for energy, carbon, etc—are equivalent
to I − E + D, where I and E are the impacts
embodied in imports and exports, respectively, and
D those occurring domestically. Conceptually simple
as footprints are, tracking the impacts of all global
extraction, production and distribution activities
and allocating these to final consumption remains
a data-intensive process, given the complexity of
globalised trade networks. EEIO models are typic-
ally used, which utilise monetary data on interna-
tional trade flows to reallocate the direct ecological
impacts of industries to where the goods/services
these industries produce are eventually consumed
[23, 24, 46, 47]. Footprints are calculated for different
product categories, and various sources of final con-
sumption, of which households, government, and cap-
ital formation (i.e. infrastructures) dominate [48, 49].
Households are most significant, with consumption
accounting for over 60% of global greenhouse gas
emissions and 50%–80% of land, material, and water
use [50]. EEIO modelling details are described in the
supplementary materials (SMs) (available online at
stacks.iop.org/ERL/16/034007/mmedia).
We focus upon carbon footprints (including all
greenhouse gases), considering inequalities in house-
hold footprints only. We do not consider inequalit-
ies in government and capital footprints, as alloc-
ating these to income groups would be non-trivial
and highly contentious. Our model utilises recent
work calculating final energy footprints for income
quintiles across 86 countries [10]—work expanded
to include The USA and Japan—and we extend the
model to carbon. We report results for final energy
in the SMs. We focus upon 32 Global North coun-
tries among these data, including the USA, Japan
and 30 European countries. Analysis is restricted to
GlobalNorth countries assuming that average income
levels are sufficient and hence, in contrast to the
Global South, the primary issue is redistribution
within countries. However, as described later there are
a small number of Global North countries in our data
where average incomes are low.
Within EEIO models, calculating footprints for
the quintiles in each country involves multiplying
household expenditure vectors of each quintile with
energy- or carbon-intensity matrices for each coun-
try. Footprints across quintiles can then be used to
calculate footprint-expenditure elasticities for each
country by fitting a power law to the carbon- or
energy-expenditure curve (figure 1). The exponent
of the power law (or elasticity) gives the percentage
increase in footprint for each percentage increase in
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Figure 1. Illustrative diagram of our methodology. We first produce fair expenditure quintiles from fair inequality data and
idealised distributions (left; blue box), and also power laws relating carbon footprints to expenditure (right, red box). For
Scenarios B1, B2, C1 and C2 we then reduce household expenditures, and for C1 and C2 we redistribute reductions and calculate
government footprints to add to countries’ accounts. Finally, we combine fair expenditure quintiles with the power laws to
produce fair footprints (right, green box): these can be combined with population data to calculate national footprints.
expenditure. To introduce fair inequalities for each
country, we first narrow the spread of household
expenditure quintiles to fair levels. Second, we com-
bine these quintiles with the power laws to give fair
inequalities in carbon and energy footprints (figure 1,
bottom right). However, the elasticities we obtain,
while generally less than 1, range from 0.8 to 1.1,
which is towards the upper end of those found in
similar work (0.6–1) [25, 29, 51–53]. We therefore
combine our fair expenditure quintiles with carbon-
expenditure elasticities of 0.7 for all 32 countries to
given an additional set of outputs more in-line with
the lower end of the literature.
3.2. Modelling fair expenditure distributions
Defining fair distributions of expenditure quintiles
requires various calculations. We start with survey-
based data from Kiatpongsan and Norton [19]
describing fair income ratios for the highest earners
(CEOs, specifically) to lowest paid unskilled workers,
for 40 countries across six continents. Denoted F in
figure 1, these ratios are lowest in Scandinavian and
various Eastern European countries (F = 2–3) and
higher in places like Germany and the USA (F ≈ 7).
We simplify our model by categorising each country
as egalitarians (when F < 4), moderates (4 < F < 6)
ormeritocrats (6 < F). We then produce idealised, fair
income distributions for each—lognormal distribu-
tions, for which we denote the average of the upper
1% relative to the lowest 10% as F∗, setting F∗ to 2.5,
5 and 8 for egalitarians, moderates and meritocrats,
respectively. As income inequalities are larger than
expenditure inequalities (and wealth inequalities lar-
ger still) [6], these income distributions are then
narrowed by considering the relationship between
income inequality and expenditure inequality (see
SMs section 2), and note that due to date limitations
our assumptions here are crude. However, we vary
our assumptions in a sensitivity analysis and our key
findings are unaffected (SMs section 3). Further con-
fidence in our method of moving from fair income
ratios to fair expenditure quintiles is gained by com-
paring our outputs with survey data from the USA
that indicates preferences for fair wealth distribution
across quintiles [42] (SMs section 2).
3.3. Maintaining, reducing and recomposing
consumption
3.3.1. Scenario A
We consider five scenarios, and in our first we simply
set the means of our lognormal, fair expenditure dis-
tributions to be equal to current household expendit-
ures for each country. Scenario A thusmaintains total
expenditure for each country.
3.3.2. Scenarios B1 and B2
In our B scenarios, we reduce expenditure by cent-
ring the means of the fair expenditure distributions
upon either current medians (Scenario B1) or 2nd
quintiles (Scenario B2) of household expenditures.
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The rationale for Scenario B1 is that current income
distributions are long-tailed, with wealthier groups
taking disproportionately high shares of income [6],
and hence the median may be a better measure
of the average income and a reasonable centre for
the fair distribution. This results in modest reduc-
tions in total household expenditure (∼11% on aver-
age across countries) while, in contrast, Scenario
B2 assumes households spend significantly less on
average (∼31%). However, this approach is arguably
not as contentious as it seems: social psychologists
have long argued that with basic needs met, relative
incomes most strongly affect life satisfaction [54–56].
In a widely cited study in theUSA, half of respondents
preferred a 50% lower absolute income provided their
income level was relatively higher [57]. Studies in
Sweden [58] and Costa Rica [59] came to similar con-
clusions, adding that income-related preferences were
shaped roughly equally by considerations of absolute
and relative levels. The lower household expenditures
we assume could thus be publically acceptable (or
even preferable) if living standards were high across a
population and inequalities close to ‘fair’ levels. How-
ever, it would be speculative for us to claim with
any certainty that this situation would be publically
attractive.
3.3.3. Scenarios C1 and C2
In our final scenarios, we assume that the reductions
in household expenditure arising in Scenarios B1 and
B2 from centring on the medians and 2nd quintiles,
respectively, are reallocated to national government
services. This give us Scenarios C1 and C2, and like
Scenario A these keep total expenditure consistent. As
discussed further herein, this could be considered as
part of a public policy shift to recompose consumption,
as recently argued necessary for addressing both eco-
logical impacts and social and economic inequalities
in the affluent world [20].
For all scenarios, we first produce a new set of
what we call fair expenditure quintiles. These are
input into the footprint-expenditure power laws for
each country to produce fair carbon- and energy-
footprint inequalities (figure 1). For Scenarios 3A and
3B, the reallocated expenditures are multiplied by the
carbon (T/$) intensities of government spending cal-
culated from the EEIO model (but these footprints
are not allocated to income groups).
3.4. Methodological limitations
It is worth highlighting some limitations of our
approach before describing our results. These limit-
ations arise from two primary reasons: (a) the static
nature of our analysis and (b) coarse disaggregation
in some parts of the model.
Regarding the former, we consider aggregate
(not product specific) elasticities of carbon- and
energy-footprints within countries, and only a single
year of data. Consequently, we assume that the com-
position of consumption at each income level is not
affected either by the level of income inequality or the
reallocation of spending to public services (although
by narrowing income distributions, we implicitly
assume shifts in the composition of countries’ overall
consumption). In reality, the substantial recomposi-
tion of consumption we assume may lead to very dif-
ferent spending patterns, which become more appar-
ent in the longer-term.
Regarding aggregation, when reallocating to
government expenditure, we only consider average
carbon intensities rather than separate ones for deliv-
ering healthcare, education, etc (which is not pos-
sible with our EEIO model’s categories). Further,
we reallocate to government services, but not infra-
structure formation. The latter are more carbon-
intensive in terms of impact per unit-spent, but, in
contrast, they can be designed to cultivate low-carbon
social practices. Finally, there is the resolution of our
income groups; five per country. One consequence
of this is that in moving from current to fair income
ratios, we make crude assumptions that could be
substantially improved (see SMs, section 2). More
granular income groups would also allow for more
detailed predictions of elasticities and hence ana-
lysis of ecological inequalities. However, there is a
conflicting issue: the energy and carbon intensit-
ies for each product category in EEIO models are
generally fixed such that, for a given product cat-
egory, a unit of expenditure by the lowest and highest
income groups is assumed to have the same footprint,
and neither is there a distinction between ‘green’
and conventional purchases. The former assumption
becomes increasingly tenuous for highly disaggreg-
ated income groups, so our quintile-approach pre-
vents it from becoming overly problematic. Together,
these limitations leave substantial room for future
research.
4. Results
4.1. Implications for footprint inequalities
Our method of translating public notions of fair
income ratios into fair expenditure quintiles gives
inequalities consistently lower than current found in
all of the 32 countries (figure 2; left). We focus on the
ratio of the household expenditure of the top quin-
tile to that of the bottom quintile; a ratio independ-
ent of our scenarios. Currently this is∼2.5–4.5 across
the 32 countries, while fair ratios for egalitarian,mod-
erate and meritocratic countries are 1.7, 2.1 and 2.3,
respectively. Current expenditure inequalities thus
exceed fair levels even in countries where the largest
inequalities are preferred. Income inequality is higher
than expenditure inequality and, by this ratio, only
weakly correlated with it—it is highest in the USA at
9, and lowest in various Scandinavian counties at∼4.
The lack of correlation between current and fair levels
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Figure 2. Plots of household income vs. expenditure inequalities (left) and carbon-footprint inequalities (right) for each of the 32
counties. Inequalities are measured as the ratio of the top to bottom quintile (T20/B20). Both current and fair data are shown; as
they do not overlap, they are delineated by the dashed grey squares (left) and dashed grey line (right). Horizontal bars on the right
represent the mean ratios for current and fair carbon footprints, and the crosses represent the fair ratios when an elasticity of 0.7
is assumed for all countries. Country codes are as follows: BEL= Belgium, BGR= Bulgaria, CZE= Czech Republic,
DEU= Germany, DNK= Denmark, FIN= Finland, FRA= France, GBR= Great Britain, GRC= Greece, JPN= Japan,
LVA= Latvia, NLD= Netherlands, NOR= Norway, SWE= Sweden and TUR= Turkey.
of inequality present is unsurprising considering lit-
erature suggests perceived (not existing) inequalities
influence ideals of fairness [45, 60].
Carbon-footprint inequalities closely resemble
inequalities in expenditure, for current and fair dis-
tributions. Current ratios of top to bottom quin-
tiles are between 2.2 and 4.7—lowest in Norway and
the Netherlands; highest in Finland and Greece. Fair
inequalities in carbon footprints are much lower,
with ratios of 1.6–1.8 for egalitarian countries, 1.9–
2.3 for moderates, 2.1–2.4 for meritocrats, or 1.5, 1.7
and 1.8 when an elasticity of 0.7 is used (crosses
on figure 2 right). Again, there’s no clear relation-
ship between current and fair footprints: Bulgaria
stands out as a country where preferences for low
economic inequality exist alongside high current eco-
nomic and footprint inequalities, while in Japan the
situation is reversed. Similar patterns are found for
final energy (see SMs). Overall, applying fair levels
of income and expenditure inequalities leads to sub-
stantial reductions in footprint inequalities within
countries, particularly when current inequalities
are high.
Although our focus here is on within-country
inequalities, it is worth briefly discussing inequalities
across countries. As we only consider countries in the
(wealthier) Global North, one may expect that sub-
stantially reducing inequalities within countries—
as implementing fair inequalities does—would also
lead to a substantial reduction in inequality meas-
ured across all countries. However, the latter change
is modest, as current within-country inequalities
between upper and lower quintiles are comparable
to between-country inequalities in average carbon
footprints. For example, Luxemburg, the USA and
Norway have per-capita footprints 4–5 times lar-
ger than Bulgaria and Turkey; equal to current
ratios for more unequal countries (figure 2; right).
Consequently, between-country inequalities, and the
still significant fair inequalities within countries,
together mean that inequality across all 32 countries
remains substantial. Gini coefficients are reported in
figure 3.
4.2. Implications for total footprints
4.2.1. Scenario A
While implementing a notion of fair income inequal-
ity substantially reduces carbon-footprint inequal-
ities within nations, overall footprints change neg-
ligibly if mean household expenditures are fixed
(figure 4 left). This is true even when elasticities are
uniformly set to 0.7, which maximises the carbon
trade-off of redistribution in our model—total emis-
sions increase <2%. Thus, all else being equal, redu-
cing inequalities is not a means to mitigate carbon
emissions, and whether a country is egalitarian or
meritocratic is inconsequential for its overall carbon
footprint.
4.2.2. Scenarios B1 and B2
Centring the mean of the fair distributions upon
current median household expenditures in Scen-
ario B1 leads to reductions in carbon footprints of
up to 20%, or 11% aggregated across all countries.
Comparable numbers for Scenario B2 are footprint
reductions of up to 40%, or 31% across countries.
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Figure 3. Lorenz curves of household carbon footprints across all 32 countries (left) for current footprints, Scenario A, and
Scenario A with elasticities of 0.7; Gini coefficients are reported in the brackets. On the right, carbon footprints across quintiles in
Luxembourg are shown for various scenarios. Note that data for Scenarios B and C are very similar to Scenario A, so are not
shown on the left figure.
Figure 4. Carbon footprints with fair distributions applied for the five scenarios, plotted for individual countries (left) and
aggregated across countries (right). On the right, stacked light bars show increases when an elasticity of 0.7 is applied, and the
dashed line indicates current emissions. On the left, the lines are regressions with intercepts forced to zero—these are for
visualisation only, so no statistics are given.
These reductions are proportional to the reductions
in household expenditure—therefore, if the same
reductions in countries’ average expenditures were
applied but with levels of inequality left unchanged,
footprint reductions would be almost the same.How-
ever, this would imply proportional reductions in
expenditure for those already at the bottom. In con-
trast, footprint and expenditure reductions in Scen-
ario B1 are absorbed largely by the upper two quin-
tiles, while footprints of the lower two quintiles rise
(figure 3, right). Implementing fair levels of inequal-
ity thus allows for significant reductions in average
expenditure without a notable effect on those in the
middle and while increasing consumption of those at
the bottom. Evenwith themore significant reductions
of Scenario B2, the lowest quintile remains unaffected
(figure 3, right), or when we fix elasticities to 0.7 foot-
prints of the bottomquintiles increase by∼25%while
those of the top quintiles decrease by ∼40%. How-
ever, lowering elasticities also means aggregate foot-
print reductions of Scenarios B1 and B2 are reduced
by 1/3 and 1/4 (to 8% and 21%).
Froma global perspective these reductions are sig-
nificant. The total carbon footprint of the 32 coun-
tries is 10.5 Gt CO2e (figure 4 right)—20% of global
levels for the same year (53 Gt CO2e) [3]. Scen-
ario B1 and B2 reduce the total carbon footprint of
these 32 countries by 1.2 Gt CO2e and 3.3 Gt CO2e,
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respectively. The latter is equivalent to a 6.2% reduc-
tion in global emissions—significant, given these 32
countries cover only 1/7th of the global population,
we apply no reductions to carbon intensities, nor do
we assume any shift to greener consumption. In other
words, the reductions we find could be additional to
all the strategies considered in conventional mitiga-
tion scenarios.
4.2.3. Scenarios C1 and C2
In our scenarios that reallocate reductions in
expenditure to national government spending foot-
prints remain substantially reduced, as the carbon
intensity of government spending is significantly
lower than of households (except in Bulgaria). Scen-
ario C1 leads to reductions in carbon footprints of up
to 15%, or 6% aggregated across all countries—just
over half the reductions of Scenario B1. Reductions
for ScenarioC2 are up to 30%, or 16% in aggregate. At
1.7 Gt CO2e in absolute terms (figure 4 right), Scen-
ario C2 is equivalent to a 3.2% reduction in global
emissions. Note again that these footprint reductions
could be made without reducing inequalities, but
with the associated cost of substantially reducing the
consumption of those at the bottom.
5. Discussion and conclusions
We have found that reducing economic inequalit-
ies within countries of the Global North, in line
with public notions of economic fairness, substan-
tially reduces national energy- and carbon-footprint
inequalities. However, there are no reductions in
overall footprints unless total household expendit-
ure is also reduced. Without broader economic
changes, then, the level of inequality publically con-
sidered fair appears inconsequential for ecological
impacts. Reductions in footprints can be achieved
by recomposing consumption [20]—specifically, by
reducing household expenditure inequalities to fair
levels, reducing mean household spending to cur-
rent median levels (or current 2nd quintiles), and
then reallocating savings to national government
spending. Narrowing inequalities is not necessary for
these footprint reductions—the same can be achieved
through reductions in mean household spending
alone. Crucially, however, the combination of redu-
cing inequalities to fair levels and lowering total
household spending means footprint reductions are
largely absorbed by the upper two income quintiles,
while the consumption of those at the bottom still
rises. It thus reduces excessive luxury spending [61]
ofwealthier groups—where the returns forwell-being
are marginal at-best [62]—while allowing increases
in consumption at the bottom where it is needed
the most.
Reducing carbon footprints by recomposing con-
sumption in this way also leaves available the full
range of conventional measures to reduce carbon
emissions, both technological (e.g. renewable energy)
and demand-side (e.g. low-impact diets). And there
could be a number of other positive impacts. For
one, this could satisfy public desires for economic
inequalities to be reduced; desires reported in sur-
veys universally across the Global North. Further,
increased national government spending could be
directed towards social goods like national healthcare
systems—whose weaknesses have been exposed by
Covid-19—or, more broadly, towards things like uni-
versal basic services (UBS). UBS could have additional
redistributive effects by guaranteeing the housing,
healthcare, educational and mobility needs of the less
affluent are met [61].
But what are the practicalities of this? Our model
assumes that widely held public notions of economic
fairness are realised and we have not considered the
political feasibility of this. There is evidence that
widening economic inequalities increase support for
redistribution [63], but desires for less inequality are
not always backed by equal support for redistribution
[45]. Even when they are, there’s no guarantee action
will follow, given the wealth and power of the super-
rich [64]. These questions are beyond our scope, but
it is worth highlighting that in the present political
climate, while the idea of placing a floor on con-
sumption to alleviate substandard living conditions is
widely accepted, capping consumption and affluence
remains a contentious topic despite arguments of the
ecological importance of such a step [65]. Reducing
inequality is the 10th of the UN’s SDGs, but with no
caps on high consumers it is difficult to imagine this
being achieved without ecological limits being sub-
stantially overshot, along with any chance of meeting
the other SDGs.
This brings us to a final quite serious limita-
tion of our work, namely that we have focused only
upon redistribution within countries—an approach
that has been criticised for side-lining a crucial global
perspective on inequality [25]. Rationales for redis-
tribution between countries are numerous, ranging
from poverty alleviation through colonial repara-
tions to funding climate adaptation programmes in
regions that, despite negligible contributions, are
placed to be hit hardest by climate change. Yet
international economic inequalities remain substan-
tial, and the gaps between rich and poor coun-
tries cannot be justified via the meritocratic ideals
people drawn upon to justify fair inequalities within
countries.
It is worth noting, then, that in Scenarios C1
and C2, where we lower and narrow household
expenditure distributions and reallocate reductions
to government spending, the total amount realloc-
ated across the 32 countries is substantial at $1.4 and
$3.8 trillion—3.5% and 9.6% of these countries’ col-
lective GDP (in Scenarios C1 and C2, respectively).
Redistributing just ∼3%–10% of this expenditure
internationally would match the amount of Official
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Development Assistance flowing from OECD coun-
tries to the Global South (ODA was $0.12 tril-
lion in 2011—just 0.3% of contributors’ GDP;
www.oecd.org/dac).
While it may be important and timely to focus, as
we have, upon public preferences for reducing levels
of economic inequality within wealthy countries, this
is clearly insufficient for dealing with the fact that
even average consumption in such countries is typ-
ically excessive and leaves insufficient space for the
development needs of poorer countries. Moreover, if
the levels of economic inequality publically deemed
to be fair were realised within wealthy countries of
the Global North, but poorer countries of the Global
South were left underdeveloped and overheated by
climate change, this could not possibly pass any reas-
onable definition of fair.
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